Bargaining in the Absence of Property Rights. An Experiment by Engel, C.W. (Christoph) & Bar-Gill, O.
477
[ Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 59 (May 2016)]
© 2016 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/2016/5902-0016$10.00
Bargaining in the Absence of Property  
Rights: An Experiment
Oren Bar-Gill    Harvard University
Christoph Engel    Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Abstract
The Coase theorem posits that if (1) property rights are perfect, (2) contracts are 
perfectly enforceable, (3) transaction costs are zero, (4) preferences are common 
knowledge, and (5) parties are rational, then the initial allocation of entitlements 
matters only for distribution, not for efficiency. We study, in an experimen-
tal setting, whether condition 1 is necessary. Our results suggest that property 
rights have a limited effect on efficiency.
1. Introduction
The Coase theorem (Coase 1960) states that if (1) property rights are perfect, 
(2) contracts are perfectly enforceable, (3) transaction costs are zero, (4) pref-
erences (valuations) are common knowledge, and (5) parties are rational, then 
the initial allocation of property rights matters only for distribution, not for ef-
ficiency. Through ex post bargaining, the asset ends up with the individual who 
values it most highly (for a survey of the literature, see Korobkin [2014]). We 
challenge the necessity of condition 1 and ask, Does the Coase theorem require 
absolute property rights, that is, in rem rights against any nonowner (condition 
1)?1 Or are relative property rights—rights only against other parties to a contract 
(condition 2)—sufficient?
A game-theoretic analysis suggests that relative property rights are sufficient 
(compare Kaplow and Shavell 1996). This analysis critically depends on condition 
5—that parties are rational and, moreover, that they have standard “homo eco-
nomicus” preferences. Under these assumptions, efficiency always obtains, with 
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1 We use the terms “absolute property rights” and “property” interchangeably.
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or without absolute property rights. We experimentally test whether the equiv-
alence between absolute and relative rights holds when condition 5 is relaxed, 
namely, when behavioral forces are introduced. We call this the equivalence hy-
pothesis. (The introduction of behavioral forces also puts pressure on condition 
4. While we can experimentally ensure common knowledge of standard prefer-
ences and valuations, the experimental setting allows for imperfect information 
about nonstandard preferences, such as fairness preferences.)2
In the textbook version of the Coase theorem (with condition 1), the main 
challenge to efficient allocation arises when the good is initially allocated to the 
lower-valuation user. Efficiency requires that the higher-valuation user buy the 
good from its initial owner. In our version of the theorem, with no absolute prop-
erty rights, the challenge to efficient allocation is different: in the absence of prop-
erty, even if the good is initially allocated to the higher-valuation user, it might be 
taken by the lower-valuation user. Efficiency requires that the higher-valuation 
user acquire a contractual right that would prevent the lower-valuation user from 
exercising her right to take. Is Coasean bargaining equally efficient in both ver-
sions? Or do the behavioral forces cause greater interference in our version of the 
theorem with only relative rights?
If relative property rights and absolute property rights are equivalent, the 
higher- valuation user must be similarly willing to buy the good from the indi-
vidual with lower valuation (absolute right) and to pay for the other individual 
not to take her good (relative right). This is what we test with our first treatment. 
Ultimately, in a world without property, taking is pointless. The original posses-
sor could always take the good back, and so forth (see Kaplow and Shavell 1996). 
In such a world, the only technology for creating value is contract. We capture 
this dimension of the distinction between absolute and relative rights in our sec-
ond treatment, in which the good is destroyed unless the parties agree on secured 
possession. We find that, irrespective of treatment, trade occurs in about 75 per-
cent of cases. Neither treatment affects efficiency. We also do not find a signifi-
cant difference in the price that the low-valuation individual asks when selling 
the good, refraining from taking the good, or agreeing that the good should not 
be destroyed. The equivalence hypothesis is supported by the data.
One might object that our experimental design undermines the difference be-
tween absolute and relative property rights. Participants might see the good as a 
pretext for a bargaining experiment, or they might view the initial allocation of 
the good to one party as normatively irrelevant. In two complementary ways, we 
investigate whether this objection is critical. First, we add a treatment in which 
we refer to taking as stealing. This framing manipulation has no discernible ef-
fect. Second, we have the initial possessor earn the good in a real-effort task. This 
2 The few experimental papers that study Coasean bargaining with imperfectly protected property 
rights focus on other conditions: Cherry and Shogren (2005) focus on condition 3 and introduce 
transaction costs, whereas Croson and Johnston (2000) and Ayres (2005) focus on condition 4 and 
study the effects of asymmetric information. Aivazian, Callen, and McCracken (2009) also find an 
effect of ill-defined property rights in situations in which the group is larger than two and no prop-
erty rights are assigned.
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has a small, weakly significant negative effect on the probability that the good 
trades. If we combine the earning and the framing manipulations, takers demand 
less (but still more than 50 percent of the value of the good), yet the probability of 
trade remains unaffected.
Our research question is practically relevant. Many valuable assets are not le-
gally protected. Must a neighbor accept vibrations, noise, or smell? Legal sys-
tems differ in where they draw the line, that is, in the way they define and enforce 
neighbors’ property rights. But a contract in which one neighbor promises not to 
use her land in a way that would be perfectly legal is always enforceable.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 derives hypoth-
eses from theory and from the existing experimental literature. Section 3 intro-
duces the design of the experiment. Section 4 reports results from the main ex-
periment. Section 5 reports on the framing manipulation. Section 6 discusses the 
earning manipulation. Section 7 concludes.
2. Hypotheses
2.1. Setup
Assume a society of size N = 2. Individuals H and L are both endowed with e 
units of a perfectly transferable, scalable, and protected means of payment. There 
is a single unit of a good. Without loss of generality, we assume that the value of 
this good to individual H is vH > 0, and the value of the good to individual L is 
vL = 0. Valuations are common knowledge. We further assume that e > vH > 
vL = 0, so that there is no budget constraint. Contracts are perfectly enforceable. 
Concluding and enforcing contracts are costless. The act of taking the good is 
similarly costless. Because L is allowed to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, L has all 
the bargaining power.
2.2. Standard Theory
If individuals hold standard preferences, which are common knowledge, and 
there are no transaction costs, then the efficient outcome is always reached as 
long as contracts are enforceable. In the textbook version of the Coase theorem, 
in which the good is initially allocated to party L and L’s entitlement is protected 
with a property rule, L sells the asset to H for vH[-ε]. In our version of the theo-
rem, in which the good is initially allocated to party H but H’s entitlement is not 
protected, L threatens to take, and H and L sign a contract, by which H pays L a 
bribe of vH[-ε] and L commits not to take. From a standard game- theoretic per-
spective, the textbook version of the theorem and our version are indistinguish-
able. Therefore, our null hypothesis reads as follows:
3 One may also draw an analogy to the law of adverse possession. If the statutory period has 
elapsed, in law the disseisor is the owner. If she values the piece of land less than the original owner, 
the efficient outcome (the original owner gets the land back) can obtain only through Coasean bar-
gaining. Strictly speaking, this is an application of the textbook version of the Coase theorem. But 
it shares a flavor of our version of the theorem in that the right not to give the land back could be 
interpreted as legalized squatting.
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Hypothesis 0.
a) The asset always ends up with H.
b) Individual H pays vH[-ε].
2.3. Behavioral Qualifications
We adopt a simple bargaining protocol: L makes an offer, and H decides 
whether to accept or reject the offer. In describing possible behavioral effects, it is 
useful to address these two stages in reverse order.
First, what is the maximum amount that H would be willing to pay? This 
maximum amount constitutes H’s reservation price, which we denote R. In the 
game-theoretic analysis, R = νH. In a behavioral model, H’s reservation price in-
cludes additional dimensions. Consider the standard version of the Coase theo-
rem, in which the good is initially allocated to party L and L’s entitlement is pro-
tected with a property rule. The maximal amount that H would be willing to pay 
to purchase the good from L is affected by H’s preferences for fairness.4 Formally, 
let x denote the strength of H’s fairness concerns. The maximal amount that H 
would be willing to pay, in this behavioral model, is R = νH - x. Next, consider 
our version of the Coase theorem, in which the good is initially allocated to party 
H but H’s entitlement is not protected. Here, in addition to standard fairness 
concerns, a heightened fairness concern, reflecting a reluctance to pay for what is 
aleady mine, may further reduce H’s reservation price R.5 Let y denote this addi-
tional behavioral effect. We thus have R = νH - x - y.
We now turn to L: what amount will L offer? A perfectly rational (and risk- 
neutral) L who seeks to maximize her absolute monetary payoffs will try to pre-
dict R and make an offer that maximizes the expected payment (magnitude of the 
offer multiplied by the probability of acceptance). In the standard version of the 
theorem, L would form a prediction: = -ˆ ˆhR v x ,  where e= +ˆ xx x  and the er-
ror term εx is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F(εx). 
Then L would offer an amount m that maximizes £ ´ˆProb( )m R m,  or Prob(εx 
≤ νH - x - m) × m. With this chosen value of m, there is a probability Prob(εx 
≥ νH - x - m) that efficient trade will not occur. In our version of the theorem, 
L’s prediction of H’s reservation price is = - -ˆ ˆ ˆhR v x y ,  where e= +ˆ yy y  and 
the error term εy is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function 
4 As an entire literature on ultimatum games demonstrates, offers deemed grossly unfair are often 
rejected (Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982; Oosterbeek, Sloof, and van de Kuilen 2004; Hoff-
man, McCabe, and Smith 2008; Cooper and Dutcher 2011).
5 An endowment effect, driven by loss aversion, may also change H’s reservation price (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler 1991; Tversky and Kahneman 1991; Thaler et al. 1997; Kőszegi and Rabin 2006). 
Indeed, loss aversion may increase H’s reservation price R. Other explanations for an endowment 
effect (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990, 1991; Rachlinski and Jourden 1998; Tversky and Grif-
fin 2000; Korobkin 2003) are ruled out by our experimental design. We use a simple token, and no 
endowment effect has been found with tokens (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990). Attachment, 
which is one potential source of the endowment effect, is unlikely to form with tokens (compare 
Kelman 1978–79; Brosnan et al. 2007). And regret, another potential source of the endowment ef-
fect, is unlikely to be triggered, since the token is originally assigned by the experimenter (compare 
Gilovich and Medvec 1995).
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G(εy). In this case, L would offer an amount m that maximizes £ ´ˆProb( )m R m, 
or Prob(εx + εy ≤ νH - x - y - m) × m. With this chosen value of m, there is 
a probability Prob(εx + εy ≥ νH - x - y - m) that efficient trade will not occur. 
In both cases, the source of the inefficiency is prediction error, and the likelihood 
of bargaining failure increases in the variance of the error distributions F(εx) and 
G(εy) (compare Bebchuk 1984). But in our version of the theorem, L needs to es-
timate two variables, x and y, whereas there was only a single variable to estimate 
in the standard version. Prediction thus becomes more difficult, and prediction 
error and inefficiency become more likely. Note also that the introduction of a 
new variable y that reduces the reservation price R reduces L’s optimal offer m.
Furthermore, in our version of the theorem, disjunction between bargaining 
power and the initial allocation of the good might further increase the likelihood 
of prediction error. In the standard version of the theorem, the same party, L, 
both gets the good and enjoys all of the bargaining power. In our version, bar-
gaining power is allocated to one party, L, while the good is initially allocated 
to the other party, H. Is L entitled to a larger share of the surplus, since she was 
granted all the bargaining power? Is H entitled to a larger share of the surplus, 
since the good was initially allocated to him? What is the relative strength of these 
competing claims? Here L would be uncertain about how H resolves these issues, 
and this uncertainty increases the likelihood of prediction error and inefficiency.
We have thus far assumed a perfectly rational L who seeks to maximize her 
absolute monetary payoffs. How does the analysis change when L is a behavioral 
actor? In the standard version of the theorem, the only behavioral effect involves 
fairness concerns. We have seen the implications of H’s fairness concerns. But 
L may herself care about fairness. And this could reduce the amount that L de-
mands and thus the likelihood of an inefficient failure to trade. In our version of 
the theorem, there is a second behavioral effect: a heightened fairness concern 
pushes H’s reservation price further downward. But, in addition, L herself may 
be averse to taking, perceived as stealing. Experiments find (limited) hesitance to 
steal (Falk and Fischbacher 2002; Schildberg-Hörisch and Strassmair 2012; En-
gel and Nagin 2015; see also Prudencio 1982; Lewinsohn-Zamir 2012). And this 
hesitance could reduce the amount that L demands and thus the likelihood of an 
inefficient failure to trade.
In both situations—the standard version of the theorem and our version—
there is a behavioral effect (or more than one) that pushes H’s reservation price 
downward and a corresponding effect that pushes L’s offer downward. We expect 
the effect on H’s reservation price to be stronger than the effect on L’s offer: H be-
ing left with a smaller share of the surplus would likely be more painful to H than 
it would be to L. Similarly, the loss that H experiences from taking, perceived as 
stealing, would likely be more painful to H than to L. In this case, L may not be 
aware of this asymmetry since she suffers from self-serving bias (see Loewen stein 
et al. 1993; Babcock and Loewenstein 1997; Haisley and Weber 2010). Or she may 
mispredict the degree of the asymmetry. Hence, even if L also holds social prefer-
ences, there is room for inefficiency.
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We stress that our experiment is not meant to test a particular behavioral the-
ory or to discriminate between different behavioral effects. All we need, and all 
we test, is the prediction that in our version of the theorem the likelihood of a 
successful bargain is lower and L’s offer is lower, for one of the potential behav-
ioral reasons that we have discussed or some combination of them. In particular, 
we test the following alternative hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1.
a) Individual H does not always obtain the good.
b) Bargaining failure is more frequent if H does not have a property right in 
the good.
c) The price demanded by L is lower if H does not have a property right in the 
good.
3. Design
Our baseline is the textbook version of Coase’s theorem: an individual with low 
valuation for a good (which we fix at 0) holds an absolute right in the good. The 
individual with high valuation may buy the good from her.
We compare this baseline with two treatments. Each treatment is meant to 
capture a different potential downside of not protecting property. The first treat-
ment, Take, tests the willingness of the high-valuation user to pay for the low- 
valuation user not to take the good. To test this key aspect of the theorem, we 
simplify the situation. We initially assign the good to the high-valuation user and 
make it possible for the low-valuation user to take the good.
The first version of the experiment allows for only one possible taking (by 
the low-valuation user). In theory, in the absence of property rights, the high- 
valuation user would be able to take the good back, the low-valuation user would 
be able to take again, and so on (Kaplow and Shavell 1996). Given the possibility 
of reciprocal takings, the good is worthless in the absence of a contract. Any value 
requires a contract. To capture this aspect of the theory, we conduct a second 
version of the experiment, the Destroy treatment. In this version, the experimen-
tal protocol provides for the destruction of the good unless the parties conclude 
a contract. One may also say that, in this treatment, participants bargain over 
the right to undisturbed use. While this protocol captures the reciprocal takings 
problem implied by the absence of property, one may wonder whether it has ad-
ditional behavioral implications. Each version of the experiment thus captures a 
separate dimension of bargaining in the absence of an absolute property right.
The examples from legal practice listed in Section 1 map more directly to the 
Take treatment: a neighbor may annoy me with her noise, smell, or vibrations 
(and thereby appropriate some of the enjoyment of my land). But there are also 
illustrations that are closer to the Destroy treatment. Not so rarely, a good has 
value only as long as it is unique. A classic illustration is a secret. If somebody else 
knows my secret, or is able to learn it, it becomes worthless unless the parties are 
able to reach a contractual arrangement. Another person may also have naked 
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threat power because she is able to (legally) inflict harm on me, say, by exercising 
a right that has no intrinsic value to her. Divorced parents fighting over the right 
to live with their child might be taken as an illustration of a feud that destroys 
what both hopefully care most about: their child’s well-being.
3.1. Baseline and Treatments
3.1.1. Baseline
In the Baseline treatment, a token good is originally assigned to individual L. If, 
at the end of the experiment, L is still in possession of the good, the good has νL = 
0. If, by contrast, H possesses the good, the experimenter buys the good at νH < 
e. Property is perfectly protected, which means that the only way for H to possess 
and use the good is by concluding a contract with L, who is allowed to make a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer. The parties are free to choose any price ∈ [0, e]. If a deal 
is struck, the good is transferred to H; L receives the price. There are no negotia-
tion or enforcement costs and no time limit.
3.1.2. The Take Treatment
In the Take treatment, we assign the token good to individual H at stage 1. At 
stage 3, individual L can unilaterally take the good from individual H. At stage 2, 
before individual L gets the chance to unilaterally take the good, the parties can 
bargain, and individual L may commit not to take the good. The bargaining pro-
tocol is as follows: individual L makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to individual H. 
There are no negotiation or enforcement costs and no time limit. If a contract is 
reached, the good stays with individual H and the game ends (we do not proceed 
to stage 3). If a contract is not reached, we proceed to stage 3, and individual L 
decides whether to take the good. And then the game ends. If individual H pos-
sesses the good at the end of the experiment, she receives her redemption value νH 
from the experimenter. If individual L possesses the good at the end of the exper-
iment, she receives her redemption value νL = 0 from the experimenter.
3.1.3. The Destroy Treatment
In the Destroy treatment, the good is originally assigned to individual H at 
stage 1. Property is not protected, which means that L is free to take the good 
or to threaten to do so. The only way for H to secure possession and use of the 
good is by concluding a contract with L. At stage 2, L is allowed to make a take-
it-or-leave-it offer. If H rejects, the good is not protected. If a deal is struck, one 
of the parties gains secure possession; the other receives a price. There are no ne-
gotiation or enforcement costs and no time limit. In order not to artificially con-
strain the negotiation space, contracts that give the good to L are permitted. At 
the end of the experiment, the good is bought by the experimenter at its redemp-
tion value, but only if the parties concluded a contract.
In our model, the good could go endlessly back and forth between the two par-
This content downloaded from 145.005.087.246 on October 10, 2018 02:19:05 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
484 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS
ties as long as no contract has been concluded. Directly translating this into an 
experimental protocol would be impractical; participants know for sure that any 
experiment ends within a reasonable time. Other experiments have created quasi 
infinity by a rule that the experiment in every period ends (after a sequence of ini-
tial periods) with a small probability. But if we had used that design option, there 
would have been more than one difference between this and the Take treatment: 
one shot versus repeated (with uncertain end) and a single option versus the op-
tion to take and to take back. Yet the critical element of the model is not the ac-
tual taking and possible taking back. The critical element is that, in the absence 
of a contract, the good is worthless. This we implement by the following rule: if 
L does not make an offer, or if H rejects the offer, the good is destroyed.6 Table 1 
summarizes our treatments.
3.2. Motives for Design Choices
We are interested in testing whether the textbook version of the Coase theorem 
and our alternative version yield different outcomes, despite the fact that stan-
dard theory predicts no difference. We therefore focus on a situation for which 
this theoretical equivalence holds. One might criticize this approach since theo-
retical equivalence requires two differences in design: presence versus absence of 
a property right and original assignment of possession to L versus H. Yet if we 
change only one of these two features in isolation, standard theory predicts fun-
damentally different outcomes (at least for the Take treatment). For testing our 
hypothesis, we cannot change one of these elements in isolation. In essence, we 
are testing whether giving a property right to L is different from giving L the op-
tion to take the good from H. Standard theory says that there is no difference. The 
behavioral analysis suggests several possible differences. (Even standard theory 
would predict a difference between the Take and Destroy treatments when νL > 
0. But when individual L values the asset at 0, these differences disappear.)
In the field, individuals who value a good less usually do not regard the good 
to be completely worthless. In the interest of increasing external validity, it might 
therefore have been attractive to set νL > 0. Yet in the Destroy treatment, the 
good is destroyed if there is no trade. We want to be in a position to compare the 
Baseline treatment with both the Take treatment and the Destroy treatment and 
6 Since the game remains one shot, we also have no reason to consider the possible additional 
complication resulting from the need to predict the timing preferences of the negotiation partner.
Table 1
Comparison of Treatments
Baseline Take Destroy
Original good allocation L H H
Property right Yes No No
Bargaining power L L L
Effect of bargaining failure Good stays with L L may take good Good is destroyed
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the latter two treatments with each other. Now, if bargaining fails in the Baseline 
and Take treatments, L is still in possession of the good. Consequently, had we 
chosen νL > 0, there would have been a confounding difference between the De-
stroy treatment and the remaining two versions of the experiment: a difference 
in payoffs in case negotiations fail (νL > 0 versus 0). This confound would have 
prevented us from meaningfully comparing the different versions of the experi-
ment.7
3.3. Timeline
In both versions of the experiment, participants are randomly matched to 
groups of two. All are endowed with e = 40 units of an experimental currency 
ECU. There is 1 unit of a good. Valuations for this good are randomly assigned. 
Individual H values the good at ν = 30 ECU, and individual L values the good at 
ν = 0 ECU. Valuations are common knowledge. Table 2 presents the time line for 
all versions of the experiment.
7 In the Take treatment, if the L player were exclusively motivated by money, she would be indif-
ferent between taking and not taking the good in the case of bargaining failure, and thus the threat 
to take would be less credible. The H player would anticipate the indifference and reject offers when 
L demanded a high price to refrain from taking. Yet this is not what we observe: there is no signifi-
cant difference between Baseline and Take or between Take and Destroy (where the negative effect 
on H’s payoff is automatic). The likely reason is behavioral. Taking the good is a technology for pun-
ishing the H player for rejecting the offer. This punishing sentiment is a well-established behavioral 
regularity. It is observed, for example, in the ultimatum game when responders reject low offers 
(Cooper and Dutcher 2011). The data on bargaining and taking from our experiment are consistent 
with this behavioral explanation. In our Take treatments, bargaining is often successful, and when it 
fails, taking often occurs. Of the 144 bargaining games (across the four Take treatments), we observe 
105 successful bargains; in 27 of the 39 cases in which bargaining fails, taking occurs. This suggests 
that H players considered L’s threats to take credible, and correctly so.
Table 2
Time Lines of Experimental Treatments
Time Description
t1 Groups are formed, valuations are assigned, and treatment conditions are defined
t2 Individual L, who has all the bargaining power, makes an offer
t3 Individual H decides whether she accepts
t4:
 Baseline If a contract is made, the good is transferred to individual H
 Take If a contract is made, the good stays with individual H
 Destroy If a contract is made, the good either stays with individual H or is transferred to 
individual L
t5:
 Baseline If a contract is not made, the good stays with individual L
 Take If a contract is not made, the taker decides whether to take the good from its 
current owner
 Destroy If a contract is not made, the good is destroyed
t6 The individual who eventually possesses the good sells it to the experimenter, at 
her valuation
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3.4. Postexperimental Tests
Our experiment tests for possible failures in Coasean bargaining and, espe-
cially, whether such failures are more frequent in the absence of property rights. 
The source of these possible bargaining failures lies in a series of behavioral reg-
ularities (see Section 2.3). To test whether these regularities affect choices in our 
bargaining game, within subjects we administer three incentivized postexperi-
mental tests and a nonincentivized questionnaire. At the beginning of the exper-
iment, participants learn only that the experiment has several parts but do not 
know what these parts are. That way, the results of the main experiment cannot 
be affected by the anticipation of later parts.
The first test is a standard ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger, and 
Schwarze 1982), with individual L in the role of proposer and individual H in 
the role of responder. Participants receive an endowment of 20 ECU. Groups are 
rematched into unannounced matching groups of six. This standard procedure 
is meant to guarantee independent observations without inducing participants 
to second-guess group composition (see, for example, Charness 2000; Montero, 
Sefton, and Zhang 2008).
The second test is a simple stealing game (Falk and Fischbacher 2002; Engel 
and Nagin 2015). Individual H is endowed with 1 unit of a good and is randomly 
paired with individual L (again from the same unannounced matching group), 
who may take the good. Whoever possesses the good at the end of this part of the 
experiment receives 20 ECU from the experimenter.
The third test is a standard instrument to measure social value orientation, 
the so-called ring measure (McClintock and Liebrand 1988). In a nonincen-
tivized questionnaire, we administer the Big Five instrument (Rammstedt and 
John 2007), ask four questions measuring trust taken from the German Socio- 
Economic Panel, and ask for basic demographic information.
The Experimental Lab of the University of Hamburg’s Economics Department 
was kind enough to run the experiment for us. The experiment was programmed 
using zTree (Fischbacher 2007). The instructions are provided in the online ap-
pendix. Participants were invited using hroot (Bock, Baetge, and Nicklisch 2014). 
As announced in the instructions, participants never learned with which other 
participant they interacted. Each treatment comprised 72 student participants 
with various majors, for a total of 216 participants, 116 (53.7 percent) of whom 
were female. Mean age was 25.58 years. The experiment lasted approximately 1 
hour, and participants on average earned €11.76 ($14.66 at the time of the exper-
iment, with a range of €4.6–€21).
4. Results of the Main Experiment
4.1. Treatment Effects
Figure 1 displays the results. In the Baseline and Take treatments, the same 
number of offers is rejected (eight of 36). In the Destroy treatment, five of the 33 
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offers that propose to give the good to H are rejected, and in the Reverse treatment 
(where L get the good and pays a price to H) two of the three offers are rejected. 
Given these numbers, we obviously do not find any significant treatment differ-
ences, whether we use nonparametric Mann-Whitney tests, estimate a paramet-
ric logit model, or include the offers (in the Destroy treatment) that propose to 
give the good to L. We also do not find any treatment differences if we condition 
the acceptance decision on the amount the L player requests. This rejects hypoth-
esis 1b and gives us the following result:
Result 1. Coasean bargaining is no less efficient in the absence of absolute 
property rights.
Strictly speaking, this result shows only that, with our data, we are not able 
to reject our null hypothesis of no treatment difference. This is not the same as 
showing that the null hypothesis is true. Power calculations indicate how much 
trust we can put in this nonresult. In each treatment, we have 36 independent 
observations. It is conventional to accept a β-error of .2. If we follow this con-
vention, we can safely detect an effect of standardized size .6696. Since all of our 
hypotheses are directed, we are justified in using a one-sided test. We may there-
fore even safely conclude that we have not overlooked an effect of standardized 
size .5918.
We see that offers also look very similar across treatments in Figure 1. Again, 
we do not find any significant differences, whether we use a nonparametric 
Mann-Whitney test or ordinary least squares regression or whether we include 
offers (in the Destroy treatment) that propose to give the good to L.8 This rejects 
hypothesis 1c and gives us the following result:
8 Since the sample size is the same as for testing the frequency of trade, the minimum standard-
ized effect size we can safely detect is also identical: .6696 for a two-sided test or .5918 for a one-
sided test.
Figure 1. Frequency of offers and acceptance by treatment (and direction of transfer)
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Result 2. In the two versions of the Coase theorem, individual L makes indis-
tinguishable price offers.
4.2. Testing Standard Theory
While we do not find any differences in the treatments, we also do not support 
our null hypothesis, which is based on standard theory. With common knowl-
edge of rationality, we should not have found 77.78 percent (Baseline and Take 
treatments) or 84.85 percent (Destroy treatment if the good is to stay with H) 
rates of acceptance; rather, the acceptance rate should be (close to) 100 percent. 
Using a binomial test, at conventional levels we can exclude that this probability 
is larger than 89 percent in the Baseline and Take treatments and larger than 90 
percent in the Destroy treatment.9 This supports hypothesis 1a.
By the same token, with common knowledge of rationality, the mean offer 
should not have been 20.97 ECU in the Baseline treatment, 19.97 ECU in the 
Take treatment, or 19.03 ECU in the Destroy treatment. Rather, irrespective of 
treatment, the offers should have been close to νH = 30, since the design gives L 
all of the bargaining power. Yet, using a one-sample signed-rank test, in the Base-
line treatment we can exclude that the offer is larger than 22 ECU.10 In the Take 
and Destroy treatments we can exclude that the offer is larger than 20 ECU.11
4.3. Explanations
We do not find any differences by treatment, which suggests that behavioral 
forces do not play a meaningful, differential role in our setup; namely, they do not 
have a meaningfully different effect in our version of the theorem as compared 
with the standard version. Our findings do not support standard game- theoretic 
predictions either: behavioral forces play a role, just not a differential role. Revis-
iting Figure 1, we observe that offers giving L more than 20 are very likely to be 
rejected. Irrespective of treatment, offers peak at 15 (νH/2) and 20 (e/2). We turn 
to the data from our postexperimental tests to understand these findings.
The fact that we do not find differences in the treatments’ offer amounts sheds 
light on the importance of the behavioral effects discussed in Section 2.3. In par-
ticular, the heightened fairness concerns and respect for ownership led us to hy-
pothesize lower offers in the treatment (hypothesis 1c), and we do not find such 
lower offers. Results from the postexperimental stealing game show that respect 
for ownership did not play a meaningful role in our setup: only six of 108 partic-
9 We avoid testing at the limit of the support by repeating the test of all probabilities between 75 
percent and 99 percent and report the lowest percentage at which a two-sided test still rejects the 
null hypothesis at conventional levels.
10 We face the same problem of testing at the limit of the support as with acceptance decisions, 
and we approach it the same way. We test whether the mean offer, in this treatment, is between 1 
and 39 ECU. We report the highest value at which the test still rejects the null hypothesis: 23 ECU, 
p = .0059.
11 The highest value at which the test rejects the null hypothesis is 21 ECU, p = .0256 in the Take 
treatment, and p = .0085 in Destroy treatment.
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ipants decided not to take the good in this game. (It would not be surprising to 
find minimal stealing in the postexperimental test and still find that loss aversion 
and respect for ownership reduce the offers in the Take and Destroy treatments: 
in the postexperimental stealing game, the taker gained positive value from tak-
ing the good, and this monetary incentive may have overcome any respect for 
ownership. In contrast, in the Take and Destroy treatments, the taker stood to 
gain nothing from taking.)12
The postexperimental ultimatum game sheds further light on the importance 
of behavioral forces in our framework. This postexperimental test replicates re-
sults from previous experiments with ultimatums. Fairness norms prevent the 
offeror from making very high offers (namely, from keeping almost all of the sur-
plus to himself). And some inefficiency results when the offeror thinks that an 
amount is sufficiently fair and the offeree thinks otherwise. These considerations 
affect the Baseline and the Take and Destroy treatments in the main experiment. 
Accordingly, they explain why results from our main experiment are not in line 
with standard game-theoretic predictions.
In Figure 2, offers in the ultimatum game are recoded as the share the proposer 
wants to keep for herself, to increase comparability between the main experiment 
and the postexperimental test. (The marker size indicates the frequency.) It is in-
teresting that offer amounts in the ultimatum game do not significantly explain 
offer amounts in the main experiment—neither in the Baseline nor in the Take 
and Destroy treatments. This result holds whether we control for treatment in the 
main experiment and whether we interact treatment with the amount demanded 
in the ultimatum game. It seems that the bargaining game—ultimatum versus 
Baseline versus Take and Destroy treatments—has an effect on how fairness 
norms manifest but that this effect is not systematic; it varies among individuals. 
We do not find any significant effects when attempting to explain choices with 
data from the ring measure of social values or from the questionnaire.
5. The Frame Treatment
As a first robustness check, we repeat the Take treatment from the main exper-
iment but now refer to taking as stealing. This Frame treatment was conducted in 
the same lab with the same software. We had 66 new participants,13 half of whom 
assumed the role of H and half of whom assumed the role of L; 48.48 percent 
were female, and the mean age was 25.03 years. Participants on average earned 
€15.19.
12 We find more stealing than is common in the literature (see, for example, Schildberg-Hörisch 
and Strassmair 2012). This is likely because we present subjects with a binary choice—steal (you 
get everything and the other party gets nothing) or not steal (you get nothing and the other party 
gets everything). Other experiments involving stealing allow for a continuous stealing decision—the 
subjects decide how much to steal.
13 In one of the three sessions, so many invited participants did not show up that we could not fill 
one matching group of six participants.
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Figure 3 compares the Take treatment without and with the stealing frame. If 
we add the frame, we see that a few more deals fail (63.64 percent of all goods 
trade, rather than 77.78 percent without the frame). Yet this difference is not 
significant whether we use a nonparametric Mann-Whitney test or a logistic 
regression or whether we control for or interact with the size of the offer. The 
mean amounts demanded by player L are virtually identical (19.97 in the Take 
treatment versus 20.00 in the Frame treatment). Unsurprisingly, we do not find 
any statistical difference regarding the amount requested, neither nonparametri-
cally nor parametrically. Of course, these are again only null effects. But we have 
enough statistical power to detect an effect of standardized size .6851 in a two-
sided test and .6054 in a one-sided test.14
6. Earned Good
In the final robustness check, whoever initially receives the good has to earn it. 
We use a simple but annoying real-effort task (as used, for instance, in Falk and 
Huffman [2007]): the participant has to correctly count the number of ones in 10 
tables of 10 × 10 with ones and zeroes. With this change we repeat the Baseline, 
Take, and Frame treatments. These additional experiments were conducted in the 
14 Power differs (slightly) from calculations in the main experiment since we had six fewer partic-
ipants (three responders) in the Frame treatment.
Figure 2. Offers in the main experiment and the ultimatum game
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same lab using the same software.15 We had 204 new participants, 59.80 percent 
of whom were female. Mean age was 25.39 years, and participants on average 
earned €15.63.
As Figure 4 shows, this manipulation changes outcomes, but only slightly. If the 
good is assigned (in the main experiment), 77.78 percent of all goods trade in the 
Baseline and Take treatments, and 63.64 percent trade in the Frame treatment. 
In the Earned Baseline treatment, even more goods trade (83.33 percent), while 
fewer goods trade in the Earned Take treatment (63.64 percent). The comparison 
between the Earned Baseline and Earned Take treatments is the only weakly sig-
nificant effect (Mann-Whitney test; N = 69, p = .0646). We are reluctant to read 
too much into this result, since the size of the offer in the Earned Take treatment 
(19.52 ECU) is not significantly different from that in Earned Baseline treatment 
(20.78 ECU). Moreover, all other comparisons of accepted offers are insignificant 
whether we use nonparametric or parametric statistics or either control for or 
interact with the size of the offer. Note in particular that even more goods (78.79 
percent) trade if the good is earned and the taking manipulation is combined 
with the Frame treatment.
This is all the more remarkable since we do find a significant effect on the size 
of the offer in the Earned Frame treatment. The average offer size in the Earned 
Frame treatment is 17.91 ECU, as compared with 20.78 ECU in the Earned Base-
line treatment—a statistically significant difference (Mann-Whitney test; N = 
69, p = .0028). The Earned Frame treatment puts our hypothesis to the hardest 
test. The results suggest that proposers are sensitive to these manipulations. They 
15 We do not repeat the Destroy treatment since it did not significantly differ from the Take treat-
ment in the main experiment. In the Earned Take and Earned Frame treatments, we were unable to 
fill one matching group of six participants each.
Figure 3. Take versus Frame treatments, with the good assigned by the experimenter
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deem it fair to leave the other participant a larger share, but this share is on aver-
age still less than half the value of the good (which is 30). In terms of efficiency, 
making a lower offer does not result in more deals. It seems that proposers offer 
to leave possessors with a larger share because they accurately anticipate that pos-
sessors will have a higher reservation price in the Earned Frame treatment. And, 
in any event, we do not see fewer trades or more inefficiency, as in the Earned 
Take treatment.
7. Conclusion
Are absolute property rights necessary for efficient Coasean bargaining? Or are 
relative, contractual rights sufficient? In a rational choice, game-theoretic frame-
work, efficiency obtains with both absolute and relative rights. In this paper, we 
show that bargaining is equally efficient when well-established behavioral regu-
larities are taken into account.
To test whether behavioral effects are more detrimental to ex post bargaining 
in our version of the theorem, we compare three situations in the lab: there is an 
absolute property right, but it is initially allocated to the individual who values 
the good less (the standard version of the theorem—the Baseline treatment); the 
good is initially allocated to the individual who values it more, but the other in-
Figure 4. Choices in treatments with assigned versus earned goods
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dividual may take it at no cost (our version of the theorem—the Take treatment); 
if the two participants do not strike a deal, the good is destroyed (our version 
of the theorem—the Destroy treatment). We find no discernible difference be-
tween these three versions of Coasean bargaining, either in terms of efficiency or 
in terms of the price at which the individual with lower valuation agrees to assign 
the good to the other individual. Coasean bargaining is as effective with mere 
contractual rights as it is with absolute property rights.
This striking result obtains even if we frame taking as stealing. When the origi-
nal possessor earns the good, we find a small reduction in the number of efficient 
trades. The robustness of this effect is, however, questionable. In particular, it dis-
appears when taking is framed as stealing—a framing that would be expected to 
intensify the effect. In the Earned Frame treatment, we find a significant effect on 
the offered price: despite having all of the bargaining power, the potential taker 
leaves the person who originally earned the good a somewhat larger share. But 
this difference in the size of the offer does not seem to affect the number of trades.
This equivalence between absolute and relative rights refutes our behavioral 
hypothesis (hypothesis 1). We predicted that our version of the Coase theorem 
(with relative rights) would trigger additional behavioral effects and that these 
effects would increase strategic uncertainty and thus the incidence of bargaining 
failure. Our equivalence result suggests either that these additional behavioral ef-
fects are weak, relative to baseline fairness concerns, or that they are predictable 
(and thus do not substantially increase strategic uncertainty).
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